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CARL KNIGHT
DESCRIBING EQUALITY*
The most basic feature of equality is probably its  comparative  or  relative  character.[1]  Whether
equality, in whatever regard, holds or not is a matter of whether a particular state  of  affairs  holds
between two or more entities. Where those  entities  are  persons  –  as  they  will  be  in  all  cases
considered here – equality of x is a state of affairs in which all persons hold the same  (amount  of)
x. Theories which aim to justify such a situation, or one which is as close  an  approximation  of  it
as  is  possible,  are,  in  a  weak  sense,  egalitarian.  Often  this  egalitarianism-as-equality-of-x  is
supplemented with the demand that, where decisions affecting persons are  made,  each  person  is
accorded equal concern and respect.[2] All are worthy of consideration, and all are  to  be  treated
as equals.       
The demand that theories  or  principles  of  justice  be  egalitarian  in  these  senses  is  not
empty. Some possible and actual theories and principles fail to meet this demand.[3] The principle
that William be given more x than Mary is clearly non-egalitarian.  Similarly,  theories  that  insist
that members of one group – be they white people, or Christians, or men, or the middle class –  be
given more x than another group are  excluded  by  the  minimal  egalitarian  demand,  unless  this
inequality is justified as a means to the end of equalizing something else. Even if we state that  we
are  treating  all  people  equally  who  are  equal  in  the  relevant  respect,  where  that  respect  is
possession of light skin colour, we are not treating all with equal concern and respect,  since  some
persons  are  excluded  from  consideration.  In  general,  the  suggestions  that  some  persons  are
entitled to more than others, or that some are to be disregarded altogether, is ruled  out.  If  a  state
were to act on such ideas it would fail to recognize the impartiality that is implied  by  equality,[4]
and perhaps even by justice itself.[5]
Nevertheless, the stated definitions of equality and egalitarianism do  not  get  us  very  far.
The suggestion that everyone should be equal in some respect is uncontroversial until the  relevant
respect is specified. Very few would dispute that  persons  should  be  treated  equally,  or  that  all
legitimate claims should be taken into account, whoever might  make  them.[6]  As  Amartya  Sen
notes, “every normative theory of social arrangement that has at all stood the test of time seems  to
demand equality of  something  –  something  that  is  regarded  as  particularly  important  in  that
theory.”[7] All the most familiar  theories  of  justice  would  qualify  as  egalitarian  in  this  weak
sense, including some which are typically viewed as rivals to egalitarianism.[8] Utilitarianism, for
instance, has “an insistence on equal weights on everyone’s utility gains in the utilitarian objective
function,” while right libertarianism offers “equality of libertarian rights –  no  one  has  any  more
right to liberty than anyone else.”[9] Utilitarians and libertarians equally distribute  particular  sets
of  rights  whose  value  to   particular   individuals   varies   with   natural,   social   and   personal
circumstances. Any definition which describes such theories as egalitarian appears to be too  weak
to  be  descriptively  adequate.  We  need  more  discriminating  ways  of   identifying   egalitarian
positions if we wish to avoid Bernard Williams’ conclusion that “when the  statement  of  equality
ceases to claim more than is warranted, it rather rapidly reaches the point where it claims less than
is interesting.”[10]
In this article I will suggest how  substantively  egalitarian  views  might  be  distinguished
from those theories which are merely weakly, or uninterestingly, egalitarian. In  each  of  the  next
three sections I will set out a condition for substantive egalitarianism. The three  conditions  are,  I
believe,  individually  necessary  and  jointly  sufficient  for  describing  a  theory  or  principle  as
substantively egalitarian. In two subsequent sections I examine whether  two  arguably  egalitarian
approaches to justice can satisfy the three conditions. A concluding section suggests some ways in
which the three conditions reflect intuitive notions of equality.
Each of the conditions has made previous appearances  in  the  literature  on  equality.  But
some parts  of  that  literature  have  remained  quite  detached  from  others.  Indeed,  while  close
relatives of the first condition  have  been  debated  in  law  reviews,  it  may  seem  quite  alien  to
political  philosophers.  According  to  the  view  advanced  in  this  paper,  this  is   a   particularly
unfortunate state of affairs, since it is maintained that the key aspects of our  egalitarian  intuitions
are explained by the combination of the first condition with the staples of political theory  that  are
the second and third conditions.
Treating like cases alike
The starting point for my presentation of the  first  condition  for  egalitarianism  may  appear  less
than promising. A quarter of a century ago, Peter Westen published an article aiming “to  establish
two propositions”:
(1) that  statements  of  equality  logically  entail  (and  necessarily  collapse  into)  simpler
statements of rights; and (2) that the additional step of transforming  simple  statements  of
rights into statements of equality not only involves unnecessary  work  but  also  engenders
profound conceptual confusion. Equality,  therefore,  is  an  idea  that  should  be  banished
from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory norm.[11]
By “equality,” Westen meant “the proposition in law and morals that ‘people who are alike should
be treated alike’ and its correlate, ‘people who are unalike  should  be  treated  unalike.’”[12]  This
proposition is, I think, implied by the weaker sense of equality mentioned in the previous  section.
One cannot be treating persons with equal concern and respect if one refuses to acknowledge  that,
in relevantly similar cases, each person should receive the same treatment. Equality of x cannot be
secured where the bases on which x is given to different people vary interpersonally.
Given the fit between Westen’s sense of  equality  and  my  weak  sense  of  equality,  it  is
unsurprising that the former is not much help in identifying substantively egalitarian theories. The
ambiguity inherent in x – is  it  welfare?  Or  is  it  some  complex  set  of  libertarian  rights?  –  is
transferred  into  the  notions  of  (un)alikeness   and   treatment   in   Westen’s   formulation.   The
substantive content of a theory depends on which features of persons it takes to be relevantly alike
and unalike and what it takes to be the appropriate responses  to  such  features.[13]  As  Westen’s
proposition (1) emphasizes, this content may be stated quite simply in terms  of  individual  rights;
the egalitarian form itself tells us nothing.
More recently, Christopher Peters has claimed that Westen  overlooked  “true  prescriptive
equality [which] is the principle that the bare fact that a person has been treated in a  certain  way
is a reason in itself for treating another, identically positioned person  in  an  identical  way.”[14]
This differs from Westen’s definition of equality by focusing on the actual treatment that a  person
(or a group of persons) has received, and  treating  exactly  that  as  a  reason  for  treating  another
person (or group of persons) in a certain way, rather  than  simply  stating  that  all  members  of  a
certain class ought to receive certain treatment. We treat likes alike because they are  alike,  rather
than for some other reason (typically to do with individual rights) that may be established  without
any need to look  at  the  relative  treatment  of  different  persons.  In  this  way,  true  prescriptive
equality   “supplies   a   substantive,   comparative   treatment   rule   to   apply   apart   from    any
noncomparative treatment rule that applies in a given case.”[15]
My proposed first condition for a theory or principle to count  as  substantively  egalitarian
is derived from Peters’ true prescriptive equality.
First Condition: the theory or principle considers the bare fact that a person is  in  certain
circumstances to be a conclusive reason for placing another relevantly identically  entitled
person  in  the  same  circumstances,  except  where  this  conflicts   with   other   similarly
conclusive reasons  arising  from  the  circumstances  of  other  persons,  in  which  case  a
compromise must be reached.
The simplest example of a conflict  between  “similarly  conclusive  reasons”  would  be  if
William and Mary are relevantly identically entitled, and they are circumstanced differently.  This
generates a reason both  for  Mary  to  be  circumstanced  as  William  is,  and  for  William  to  be
circumstanced as Mary is. The appropriate compromise is a straightforward matter, or at least is if
the circumstances are quantifiable – each receives the mean of the two sets of circumstances.  This
treatment can be extended to cases involving more than two persons readily enough.
More  complex  cases  of  conflict  involve  some  persons  who  are  relevantly  identically
entitled and some persons who are not relevantly identically entitled.  The  circumstances  of  each
of the relevantly identically entitled persons provides  a  reason  for  each  of  the  other  relevantly
identically  entitled  persons  to  be  identically  circumstanced,  as   described   above.   There   is,
however, the added complication that these circumstances, as a minimum, must be less favourable
than those enjoyed by any  persons  with  greater  entitlements,  and  more  favourable  than  those
enjoyed by any  persons  with  lesser  entitlements.  Accounts  of  equality  that  describe  relevant
entitlements  cardinally  (not  merely  ordinally)  might  further  specify  the  extent  to  which  the
circumstances of those with particular greater relevant  entitlements  should  be  better  than  those
with  particular  lesser  relevant   entitlements.   The   first   condition   therefore   allows   for   the
Aristotelian  kind  of  equality,  according  to  which  “there  is   proportion   between   the   things
distributed  and  those  to  whom  they  are  distributed.”[16]  Of  course,  the  condition  does  not
presume that justice is proportionate in this way. It just says that,  if  the  theory  in  question  does
identify multiple relevant entitlements, equality requires  a  certain  kind  of  relationship  between
those entitlements and the circumstances persons face.
 The first condition for substantive equality incorporates the insight behind the principle of
true prescriptive equality – it treats likes alike because they are alike. It  captures  the  intrinsically
(that is, not merely contingently) comparative nature of egalitarian justice by basing each person’s
treatment on that received by other persons. But it is, as the name suggests, a  condition  that  may
be met by a theory or a principle instead of a principle itself.  It  differs  from  Peters’  prescriptive
equality in three other ways.
First, by shifting from the language of ‘position’ to the language  of  relevant  entitlements,
it  makes  more  explicit  that  the  positions  of  the  persons  under  consideration  need   only   be
relevantly identical according to the egalitarian theory in question in order for the stated response
to be triggered. The fact that Mary is a woman and William is a  man,  or  that  that  the  two  have
different shoe sizes, need  not  affect  how  they  are  treated  by  the  substantive  egalitarian.  The
mechanism for  identifying  relevant  entitlements  is  a  key  part  of  every  putatively  egalitarian
theory. Entitlements may depend on the empirical  situation,  since  many  theories  give  rights  to
certain   things   only   where   certain   material   conditions    hold.    I    use    the    language    of
relevant  entitlements  in  order  to  exclude  any  entitlements  persons  may   have   that   are   not
recognized by the egalitarian theory. In doing so, I leave open the question of whether  such  ‘non-
relevant entitlements’ (for instance, entitlements due under the  law,  or  on  some  other,  possibly
non-egalitarian, theory) exist or not.
Second, it explicitly extends  the  area  of  reference  beyond  prior  treatment  by  the  first
person.  It  may  be  substantively  egalitarian  to  place  Mary  in  certain  circumstances   because
relevantly identically entitled William is in those circumstances no matter  how  William  got  into
those circumstances. It makes no difference whether William was treated  in  a  certain  way  or  is
being treated in a certain way; nor does it matter whether that treatment came from the first person
(in distributive justice this means the state or other distributive body) or from some of other  party,
or if it has not resulted from something properly described as “treatment” at all, but rather  from  a
“doing of nature.” This final possibility accounts for the reference to “circumstances”  rather  than
“treatment.” These changes are, I believe, justified because telling a distributive body how to treat
somebody, given that it has already treated somebody else, is not the only way  for  a  distributive
theory to be egalitarian. Exemplars such as equality of welfare take a distinctively egalitarian  line
even where there has been no prior  distributive  action.  Nevertheless,  the  key  contrast  between
circumstances (concerning the physical and/or mental  conditions  facing  a  person)  and  relevant
entitlements  remains  much  the  same  as  that  between  treatments   and   positions   under   true
prescriptive equality.  A  person’s  treatment  or  circumstance  is  not  a  matter  of  how  they  are
positioned, in terms of the rights assigned to them by a normative theory, but  is  rather  concerned
with their real world situation.
The final difference between the first condition and  true  prescriptive  equality  is  perhaps
the  most  significant.  This  is  the  way  the  former  takes  the  circumstances  of  one  person   as
sufficient  grounds  for  placing   another   relevantly   identically   entitled   person   in   the   same
circumstances, excepting conflicts with other grounds of circumstance. Peters, by contrast, is quite
clear that someone who is egalitarian in his sense treats the reason generated by prior treatment  as
potentially overridable.[17] The change here is required to  remove  the  possibility  of  essentially
non-substantively egalitarian hybrid theories counting as substantively egalitarian simply  because
they have some minor  comparative  component.  Consider,  for  example,  the  theory  that  social
utility ought to be maximized, but that in the event of two courses of  action  producing  the  same
utility, that which produces the most equality (in the sense of the circumstances  of  persons  being
extended to relevantly identically entitled persons) should be selected.  Where  the  reason  offered
by others’ circumstances can be less than  conclusive,  any  theory  which  states  that,  “all  things
being equal, the particular circumstances of a person must  be  matched  by  the  circumstances  of
other relevantly identically entitled persons,” would count  as  egalitarian,  even  if  “things”  were
rarely or never “equal” in the way required by that theory, and even if in the vast majority of cases
the theory was manifestly inegalitarian.
Despite  his  innovation,  Peters  draws  conclusions  that  are  similar  to  Westen’s:  “even
nontautological equality unavoidably butts up against emptiness – inescapably becomes merely an
aspect of some wholly non-egalitarian norm – or, where it cannot be  said  certainly  to  be  empty,
collapses  into  incoherence.”[18]  Can  such  an  apparently  flawed  principle  really  be  used,  in
revised form, to do the work I want it to do? I think so. This is not on  account  of  the  revisions  I
have suggested, but rather on a divergence between the perspective shared by  Westen  and  Peters
and that which we ought to take.
Both Westen’s and Peters’ conclusions seem to be shaped by a (for their purposes,  wholly
appropriate) legalistic presupposition that, where a norm might be stated in  comparative  (usually,
egalitarian) terms, or in terms of noncomparative rights, it is the latter that is  to  be  preferred;  the
egalitarian statement “necessarily collapses  into”  a  statement  of  rights.  In  the  cases  in  which
Peters claims that his form of equality is  empty,  the  reasons  offered  are  that  it  does  not  offer
reasons that are independent of nonegalitarian justice.[19] But nonegalitarian justice is  defined  in
such a broad way that it includes many typically egalitarian norms,  simply  rendered  in  terms  of
rights. For instance, it is considered nonegalitarian to state that two  ill  people,  Smith  and  Jones,
are each entitled to 75 out  of  150  available  units  of  medicine,  where  the  justification  can  be
explained in terms of their identical individual claims.[20] Westen and Peters  argue  that  equality
itself – the bare relative positions of different persons – does  not  add  any  normative  value  to  a
form of treatment (such as a distribution). Whether this is true or not  is  irrelevant  to  the  present
descriptive task of identifying which theories are  substantively  egalitarian;  it  is  not,  of  course,
irrelevant to broader questions about justice. Likewise, for present purposes little rides on the  fact
that we can describe recognizably egalitarian norms in nonegalitarian ways. Although, contrary  to
Westen’s proposition (2), it will surely often be as simple and clear (or even  simpler  and  clearer)
to state such norms in egalitarian terms rather than in rights terms  –  that  is,  as  “equality  of  x,”
rather than as “each has a right to the total x divided by the number of persons” or even “Mary has
a right to the total x divided by the number of persons, William has a right to the total x divided by
the number of persons …” – either way is valid. The question at  hand  is,  how  do  we  recognize
them as egalitarian in the first place? True prescriptive equality gives us part of the answer  to  this
question.
To see how the first condition  can  help  us  start  to  distinguish  between  egalitarian  and
nonegalitarian   theories   and   principles,   consider   equality   of   welfare,    utilitarianism    and
libertarianism. Suppose William holds a certain level of welfare and Mary holds  a  different  level
of welfare (i.e. they are each in certain differing circumstances).  Equality  of  welfare  weighs  the
demand that Mary  holds  William’s  level  of  welfare  precisely  because  he  holds  that  level  of
welfare against the demand that  William  holds  Mary’s  level  of  welfare  precisely  because  she
holds that level of welfare. It  satisfies  the  first  condition,  for  it  makes  persons’  circumstances
entirely dependent upon the circumstances  of  relevantly  identically  entitled  persons  –  and  for
equality of welfare, this means the circumstances of all persons, since all have  rights  to  an  equal
amount of welfare. But neither utilitarianism nor libertarianism satisfies the condition,  for  neither
of them takes persons’  circumstances  to  be  grounds  for  placing  relevantly  identically  entitled
persons in  identical  circumstances.  In  both  cases,  two  persons  may  be  relevantly  identically
entitled – i.e. have identical rights as the situation is such that each unit of their utility  contributes
to the social calculus in the same way (utilitarianism) or their historical entitlements  are  identical
(libertarianism) – and therefore be entitled to identical circumstances. But  the  circumstances  due
to  each  person  are  fundamentally  independent  of  the  circumstances  the  others  are  in.   The
circumstances of other persons do not enter the libertarian moral calculus at all, and only enter the
utilitarian’s moral calculations instrumentally. Mary would receive the same treatment whether  or
not William existed, provided that the background facts (to  do  with  social  utility  and  historical
entitlement) stayed the same.  They  are  treated  alike  only  because  they  are  alike  in  terms  of
relevant entitlements, not because they are alike in their  circumstances.  Similarly,  when  persons
are treated unalike, this is solely on account of their  differing  relevant  entitlements.  Mary’s  and
William’s circumstances will directly reflect their  individual  abilities  to  convert  resources  into
utility, or the set of libertarian rights each has acquired. They will have nothing directly to do with
each others’ circumstances.
Now it may be objected that the first condition for substantive equality would permit some
evidently unjust policies.[21]  Suppose  that,  in  treating  William,  we  violated  his  basic  rights,
without  even  so  much  as  a  justification  from  utility  maximization  or  other  consequentialist
considerations. To make this vivid, suppose that we have falsely imprisoned and tortured him,  for
our own obscure reasons, or for  no  reason  at  all.  Surely  egalitarian  justice  does  not  give  any
support to the demand that we treat Mary likewise, just because that is how we treated William.
Egalitarian justice makes no such demand. As indicated at the outset, the first condition for
substantive egalitarianism is necessary but not  sufficient.  It  reflects  the  inherently  comparative
nature of egalitarian justice, and nothing else about it. But there is  more  than  this  to  substantive
equality. In particular, the third condition specifies which circumstances are appropriate bases  for
the future circumstances of others.[22] Suffice to say, our treatment of William would not qualify.
First, however, we must turn to the second condition.
Full and equal consideration
The first condition for egalitarianism helps to filter out some theories and principles of distributive
justice theories that are (at least intuitively) nonegalitarian. But as we have  just  seen,  satisfaction
of the first condition is insufficient grounds for calling a theory or principle  egalitarian.  Consider
the following principles:
a) equality of welfare among men.
b) equality of welfare among men, equality  of  welfare  among  women,  higher  levels  of
welfare for men.
Both (a) and (b) are substantively egalitarian if the first condition is the only condition  for
substantive egalitarianism. The fact that a man/woman holds a certain amount of welfare is treated
as  grounds  for  another  man/woman  (i.e.,  someone  who  is  relevantly  identically  entitled   on
account of gender and age) holding that level  of  welfare,  the  fact  that  the  second  man/woman
holds a certain amount of welfare is treated as grounds for the first man/woman holding that  level
of welfare, and so on, until a compromise is reached. (a) admits no other  reasons,  while  (b)  adds
that, since  men  have  greater  relevant  entitlements,  their  circumstances  should  be  better  than
women’s,  as  the  first  condition  allows.  But  neither  principle  can  sensibly  be  thought  to  be
substantively egalitarian. If either were the sole distributive principle for a  society,  it  could  give
rise to many instances of significant social inequality. In the case of (a), there would be no limit to
the inequality, in any dimension, between men and women, or  between  women  and  women.  (b)
deals with this latter problem, but not the first; it  also  adds  a  particularly  grievous  inter-gender
inequality. In neither case is any justification  for  these  particular  types  of  (possible)  inequality
presented,  and  none  presents  itself.  At  least  one  further  necessary  condition  for  substantive
egalitarianism is needed.
A candidate is suggested  by  the  weak  egalitarianism  mentioned  in  the  opening  of  the
paper. There it was noted that such egalitarianism is strong enough to ensure  that  all  persons  are
considered, and that none are of more concern  than  others.  In  other  words,  it  ensures  full  and
equal consideration. But the italicized portions of (a) and (b) implicitly disregard or  disadvantage
all persons who do not meet certain less than compelling criteria.  An  obvious  solution  therefore
presents itself.
Second condition: the theory or principle can be stated as ‘equality of  x  for  all  persons’,
making no explicit or implicit exclusion of persons or individuals and showing  no  greater
concern and respect for some rather than others.
The second condition recognizes simple  equality  of  welfare  as  egalitarian  while  ruling
against the two more discriminatory formulations. (a) excludes everyone who is not a  man,  while
(b) clearly pays greater regard to the interests of men, with no available explanation as to why that
greater regard is justified.  But  the  first  and  second  conditions  together  are  still  insufficiently
demanding. Consider another principle: 
(c) equality of hair colour.
This principle satisfies the first condition as it considers persons’ circumstances (here=hair
colour) to  be  sufficient  conditions  for  relevantly  identically  entitled  persons  (here=any  other
person) to be in those circumstances (here=have that hair colour). It satisfies the second  condition
as it  does  not  place  limits  on  which  individuals  or  groups  the  equality  is  to  hold  between.
However, the trivial  nature  of  that  equality  makes  a  mockery  of  the  principle’s  claim  to  be
egalitarian.  With  (a)  and  (b)  we   found   that   many   notable   social   inequalities   would   go
unaddressed; with (c), all major inequalities are ignored.
One response to this problem which naturally presents itself is to focus on those  equalities
which seem valuable. Egalitarians are not concerned with just any kind of inequality;  rather,  they
“are concerned  with  how  bad  a  situation’s  inequality  is.”[23]  This  enables  us  to  cope  with
principles like (c), which, if taken as the sole distributive principle for a  society,  are  inegalitarian
by virtue of the triviality of the equality  they  secure.  But  while  this  is  part  of  the  solution,  it
cannot be the whole of it. Reconsider  right  libertarianism,  which  pursues  equality  of  rights  to
appropriate unowned resources, to retain all profits  from  free  trade,  and  so  forth.  Insofar  as  it
pursues equality, it does so  in  a  dimension  which  is  not  considered  particularly  important  by
egalitarians;  indeed,  they  may  consider  these  kinds  of  rights  to  be  pernicious   given   likely
economic and social conditions. But the right libertarian may genuinely believe that he is pursuing
equality in that dimension which is most valuable.
Two variations on this initial suggestion also fail, but in telling ways. The  first  holds  that
the initial suggestion was insufficiently demanding, in allowing a variety of different equalities  to
all count as substantively egalitarian. Ronald Dworkin states that  “it  is  necessary  to  state,  more
exactly than is commonly done, what form of equality is finally important.”[24] But this approach
faces two fatal objections. First, it is far too exacting. We are, I think, quite convinced that there is
more than one substantively egalitarian theory – equality of income, of resources,  and  of  welfare
are all clearly identifiable as theories (or groupings of  theories)  of  equality,  whatever  else  they
might be. If it turned out that, say, welfare was the most valuable thing that could  be  equalized  it
would not follow that that was the only substantive equality to be had. It might be a  better  theory
of equality than the others on offer, but it seems to abuse the language to  describe  it  as  the  only
theory that achieves substantive equality, and to thereby describe the others  as  egalitarian  in  the
same kind of way that right libertarianism or utilitarianism are. Second, it actually  aggravates  the
problem that gave rise to it in the first place. Suppose that it turns out  that  equality  of  libertarian
rights was, after all, the most valuable kind  of  equality  –  which  is  just  to  say  that  it  is  more
important that people have these kinds of “rights” respected than other kinds of “rights” (rights  to
equal welfare, for instance). It is patently absurd thereby to suggest that right libertarianism  is  the
only theory of substantive  equality,  and  that  the  various  varieties  of  equality  of  outcome  are
actually less egalitarian than it. I do not  see  how  this  kind  of  result  can  be  ruled  out  without
knowing all that there is really worth knowing about distributive justice; but we ought  to  be  able
to identify egalitarian theories even without such extraordinary knowledge.
The second variation on the “valuable equalities” suggestion seeks to limit both  the  kinds
of value and the type and pattern of distribution that  are  admissible  in  egalitarian  theories.  The
examples of typically egalitarian theories mentioned so far all put the spotlight on how well off (in
some regard) people end up. In particular, they might be interpreted  as  attempting,  with  varying
success, to equalize a certain conception of individual prudential  value  –  that  is,  to  make  each
individual’s life go just as well  as  every  other  individual’s  life.[25]  We  might  say,  then,  that
substantively egalitarian theories  are  prudential  outcome  egalitarian,  or  at  least  try  to  be  so
(income may not be a particularly good measure of prudential value, but equality  of  income  may
be a genuine attempt to  approximate  prudential  outcome  egalitarianism).  Faced  with  this  new
requirement, the libertarianism which we have been trying to exclude from our  definition  falls  at
the first hurdle – it focuses on  historical  events  (usually  individuals’  actions)  rather  than  end-
states.[26] Utilitarianism is an end-state theory, and focuses on prudential  value  (utility),  but  the
desired end-state is not one of equalization.
So far  so  good.  Unfortunately,  the  new  requirement  allows  far  too  little  to  count  as
substantive equality. Often committed egalitarians will favour a situation  of  increased  prudential
outcome inequality. This reflects the fact that they have a broader range of concerns than  the  new
requirement permits. To see this consider the case of professional baseball players.  Suppose  that,
at a certain point in time, the two largest racial groups of players were not, on the average, equally
paid. The question is  this:  is  this  prudential  outcome  inequality  –  where  one  racial  group  of
players  are  advantaged  relative  to  others  –  a  sufficient  ground,  and  the  sole  ground,  for   a
substantive egalitarian to  oppose  this  distribution?[27]  Definitely  not.  Many  other  factors  are
relevant. I will mention three possible scenarios that bring out  a  few  of  them.  In  the  first  case,
suppose that we know that the sole source for the inequality is the fact that  the  better  paid  group
performs, on the average, more effectively than the other –  that  they  are  more  productive.  This
may go at least some way to justifying the inequality. In the second case, suppose that both groups
have an identical level of performance, and that we  know  that  the  source  of  the  disadvantaged
group’s disadvantage is  the  blatant  racial  discrimination  that  they  are  subject  to  (to  give  an
extreme example, that the teams place a salary cap on one group’s players that  is  lower  than  the
minimum  salary  for  the  other  group).  Or,  alternatively,  suppose  that  there   are   no   official
discriminatory policies, but that one group’s players are more marketable  than  the  other  group’s
owing to the racism of fans, and that results in the income inequality. Would the existence of such
circumstances really make no difference whatsoever to the egalitarians’ response to the  situation?
The  egalitarian  may  well  oppose  this  distribution  more  strongly  than  in  a  case   where   the
distribution is the result of non-racially influenced market forces.
Finally, let us bring together the considerations the  first  two  cases  highlight  with  a  real
world example.[28] In 1970 the average black Major League baseball player earned more than the
average white player. However, the average black  player  of  a  certain  level  of  productivity  (as
measured by performance averages) actually earned less than the average white player of the same
level of production. It appears, then, that “blacks, on the average, earn  less  than  whites  of  equal
ability.”[29]  This  led  some  to  suggest  “that  widespread  racial  discrimination  still   exists   in
baseball, and that this racism becomes clear  only  when  salaries  are  compared  at  each  level  of
performance.”[30] I do not think that the substantive egalitarian is compelled to demand an  equal
distribution of prudential outcome in this case, where black players  have  not  only  outperformed
their white counterparts, but outperformed  them  so  much  that,  despite  evidence  of  continuing
racism (whether it be on the part of the teams  or  fans),  they  have  managed  to  surpass  them  in
salary terms. In cases like this, the would-be substantive  egalitarian  may  find  her  intuition  that
there is more to a distribution than equal prudential outcome supported in a  number  of  ways.  As
we shall see, she may  think  that,  to  some  extent,  productivity  or  merit  should  themselves  be
rewarded, or (in my view, more plausibly) that they are a useful rough guide to other things which
are not equally  spread  among  the  population  –  desert  and  responsibility  may  be  particularly
significant considerations here.
The object of egalitarian concern
Much  can  be  learned  from  the  shortfalls  of  the  three  versions  of  the  view  that  substantive
egalitarians seek to secure equality of those things which seem valuable. The first variation is both
too weak, in potentially admitting what are at  heart  non-egalitarian  theories,  and  too  strong,  in
requiring a theory to be the best account of justice in order to count as  a  theory  of  equality  (and
remember, we are not even trying to define good theories of equality here!). The second  variation
is  much  too  narrow,  in  reducing  substantive  equality  to  one   particularly   obvious   kind   of
substantive equality. In  the  end,  I  think  the  original  version  comes  closest  to  succeeding,  in
making equality something worth caring about. The problem is just that it is not  something  worth
caring about for egalitarians in particular.             
These final points are the most significant. But I do not think there is  any  “quick  fix”  for
the problem posed by cases of type (c). The objection to it is just that it is not worth  caring  about.
But there seems to be no unproblematic way of filtering unworthy entries to the formula  “equality
of x” in the pleasingly formal way that the first and  second  conditions  filter  the  particular  non-
egalitarian elements that they tackle. It is, I think, necessary to adopt a final condition for a  theory
or principle to count as egalitarian that leaves more scope to intuition.
Third condition: the theory or principle pursues equality in a dimension that is valuable to
egalitarians.
This condition is vaguer than the others, but necessarily so. We have seen that we  have  to
accept a variety of theories as egalitarian, and I think one of their distinguishing features has to  be
that they pursue a type  of  equality  that  is  valuable  –  but  not  necessarily  most  valuable  –  to
egalitarians. It may strike the reader that there is  an  obvious  circularity  here:  what  I  am  really
saying,  it  might  be  alleged,  is  that  substantive  egalitarian  theories  are  those   which   pursue
substantive equalities. But that would be an inaccurate description. In the first place,  observe  that
this condition  has  been  adopted  precisely  because  theories  which  equalize  substantively  are,
paradoxically, neither  uniquely  nor  even  necessarily  egalitarian  in  the  required  sense.  Those
theories which equalize prudential value are only one kind of substantive egalitarian theory,  while
those which equalize all-things-considered  value  need  not  be  substantive  egalitarian  at  all.  A
substantively egalitarian theory must equalize a particular kind of value –  an  egalitarian  kind  of
value. In this way, the egalitarianism of substantive egalitarianism comes in both in the pattern  of
distribution and in what is distributed. It also must be reiterated that this is  not  supposed  to  be  a
sufficient  condition  for  substantive  egalitarianism.  It  is  to  be  used  alongside   the   first   two
conditions, which we have seen can narrow down the range of candidate theories. Later it  will  be
shown that some positions which may be appear to be substantively egalitarian,  and  which  many
people assume are consonant with the usual understandings of egalitarianism, are ruled out by  the
first condition. First, however, let me say a  little  about  “usual”  understandings  of  equality  and
egalitarianism.
In  both  philosophical  and  non-philosophical  discourse,  “equality”  is  used  to  refer  to
something (an idea or a practice, for instance) which stands in  a  certain  relation  to  the  work  of
particular prominent writers and to particular social arrangements  (which  have  more  often  than
not been influenced by those writers). Jeremy Waldron puts the point quite succinctly:
“Equality,” like “liberty” and “fraternity,” is a shorthand slogan but not an abbreviation.  It
evokes  a  particular  range  of  moral  considerations  and  a   particular   set   of   complex
arguments, and it does  that,  not  by  virtue  of  its  meaning,  but  because  every  political
theorist is  familiar  with  a  tradition  of  argumentation  in  and  around  certain  texts  and
doctrines  and  knows  that  colleagues  can  be  alerted  to  the  possible  relevance  of  that
tradition by using that simple word.[31]
A substantively egalitarian theory is characterized by giving an answer  to  the  question  “equality
of what?” that falls within a certain range  of  the  possible  answers.  As  is  shown  by  imaginary
principles such as (c), and also  by  established  theories  such  as  right  libertarianism  (with  their
particular complex understandings of what it means to treat persons as equals), the x in equality of
x cannot be just anything if that theory is to be egalitarian. The position of this  range  is  informed
both by the history of moral and political thought and  by  contemporary  scholarship.  Any  claim
that  Nozickian  historical  entitlement  was  substantively  egalitarian,  or  even  as  egalitarian  as
equality of welfare, simply in virtue of its formal structure, would not  be  taken  seriously  by  the
vast majority of philosophers,  including  Nozick  himself.[32]  That  theory  firmly  belongs  to  a
different tradition, one which is opposed to the egalitarian tradition.[33] Realizing equality in  one
regard will destroy equality in another, and these equalities  hold  different  levels  of  significance
within different traditions. Which of these equalities seem to really matter to the egalitarian?
The kind of comprehensive egalitarian theory of distributive justice which is most familiar
to members of the general public is economic equality. Equality of income and equality of  wealth
are the best known theories in this field, and two of the simplest. But these theories and their close
relatives have little currency as fundamental objectives with political philosophers, for the  simple
reason that money is not, after all, what matters; or at least, not all that matters. Some  people  can
do  more  with  a  given  amount  of  money  than  other  people.  According  to  philosophers,  the
exemplary egalitarian theories are equality of resources (construed quite broadly) and  equality  of
welfare. Of the two, a given philosopher will choose  that  theory  which  accords  with  their  own
view about whether it is resources or welfare which are the appropriate objects of distribution. It is
highly likely, of course, that equality of income would lead to greater equality  of  welfare  or  that
equality of wealth would lead to greater equality  of  resources  than  present  distributive  regimes
would, but even this instrumental value is  diminished  where  we  might  bring  about  patterns  of
distribution that are tailored to the needs of the more complex equalities.
             The  point  of  this  is  not  to  dispute  the  substantively  egalitarian  nature  of   economic
egalitarianism, even as an account  of  what  justice  ultimately  requires.  Income  and  wealth  are
fields in which equalization is both valuable – though not, as philosophers note,  most  valuable  –
and  valuable  in  an  egalitarian  way  –  in  a  way  that,  say,   right   libertarian   rights   are   not.
Undoubtedly, a large part of the explanation here is the prudential value that can be  realized  with
money. But that is not the  whole  part.  Economic  egalitarians  usually  hold  individuals  at  least
partially responsible for what  they  do  with  their  money.  Wealth  egalitarianism  is  not  usually
construed as requiring  that  equality  of  wealth  holds  at  every  moment  of  time,  regardless  of
choices – if I win at the dog track, the resulting inequality is likely to hold long enough that I  will
have time to spend my winnings. Income egalitarianism certainly would not step  in  if  I  lost  my
money at the track, whereas a welfare egalitarian government  would  do,  assuming,  as  is  likely,
that my welfare will drop as a result of my actions. The dispute here really  is  an  intramural  one:
the  choice  is  not  between  substantive  egalitarianism  and  something  else,  but   between   two
different kinds of substantive egalitarianism.
            I say all this on the assumption that the theories in question satisfy the first two  conditions
for substantive egalitarianism. As already shown, this is  true  of  welfare  egalitarianism,  and  the
same demonstration could easily be extended to economic egalitarianism. These are  paradigmatic
theories  of  equality,  even  if  they  are  not  ultimately  the  best  theories  of  equality  all  things
considered. If equality of resources is construed as a kind of halfway  house  between  these  other
two  theories  –  it  equalizes  a  range  of  goods  such  as  basic  liberties,  income,  wealth,   basic
opportunities and maybe talents – it qualifies just as easily.  Someone  who  proposed  to  equalize
Rawlsian social primary goods would fall into this category, although this is not what John  Rawls
himself suggests. In each of  these  cases,  the  circumstances  of  persons  set  the  entitlements  of
relevantly identically entitled persons, all are considered to be relevantly  identically  entitled,  and
hence none are favoured or excluded.
If equality of resources is construed in the rather  more  complicated  Dworkinian  fashion,
things are much less straightforward. The same is true of equality of opportunity  for  welfare  and
similar luck egalitarian positions, though for  different  reasons.  Furthermore,  these  complexities
are  not  limited  to   elaborate   philosophical   theories.   Some   social   policies   that   are   more
commonplace (in discussion,  at  least)  than  even  the  most  familiar  comprehensive  egalitarian
theories appear to be far less obviously egalitarian than popular opinion might hold. Let  us  begin
with the last of these topics.
Application to prioritarianism
In contemporary developed countries there is consensus that there should  be  a  certain  minimum
level of income, education, and healthcare for all persons. People who wish to set these  minimum
levels at significantly higher levels than those  that  presently  exist  are  popularly  known  as  left
wingers,  social  democrats,  or  (in  the  US)   liberals.   Let   us   call   this   view   “contemporary
egalitarianism.” Now consider the following social policies:
1) Where the levels of income, education, and healthcare of the worst off can be increased by
making  a  disproportionately  larger  increase  in  the  levels  of  income,   education,   and
healthcare of the better off, make these changes.
2) All things being equal, increase  the  levels  of  income,  education,  and  healthcare  of  the
better off.
3) Where the levels of income, education, and healthcare of the worst off reach a certain level
that  is  still  below  the  average  level,  maximize  the  total  societal   levels   of   income,
education, and healthcare.
Each of these policies is quite consistent with the defining attitude of  a  contemporary  egalitarian
(assuming that  the  “certain  level”  in  [3]  is  appropriate).  One  may  even  adopt  contemporary
egalitarianism and all of these strategies. I will not speculate about  how  common  this  might  be,
but I am sure that each of these views is held by some people who are  contemporary  egalitarians.
With equal certainty, I can say that each of these strategies is inconsistent with equality of income,
with equality of education, and with equality of healthcare. This is  simply  because  each  strategy
promotes (or, in the case of [3], may promote) inequality in the specified fields –  it  increases  the
percentage difference in income, education, and healthcare levels between  the  better-off  and  the
worst-off. Contemporary egalitarianism  is  consistent  with  such  strategies  because  it  does  not
equally distribute the goods in question. Income, education, and healthcare are distributed without
reference to the comparative circumstances of  persons.[34]  The  main  focus  is  on  the  absolute
amounts of these goods that find their way into the hands of the worst off.
If contemporary egalitarians are not  egalitarian  by  virtue  of  demanding  equality  in  the
dimensions with which they are explicitly concerned, how might the  characterization  of  them  as
egalitarian be explained? It might just be  that  it  is  mistaken.  Maybe  people  are  just  generally
confused about the different strategies available to the left. If the characterization is not  mistaken,
it might reflect the fact that these persons endorse equality in some other dimension – welfare, say
– and simply endorse the policies that are supportive  of  that  goal  that  have  the  best  chance  of
political acceptance. The most interesting possibility, though, is that  their  focus  on  the  absolute
position of the worst off is fundamentally egalitarian in a broader sense.
This last possibility might be fleshed out with any of  several  distributive  principles.  The
most famous of these is Rawls’ “difference principle,” which combines a focus on “relevant social
positions” (rather than individuals) with a maximin strategy, thereby maximizing the  condition  of
the worst off group. [35] The closely related leximin strategy maximizes the condition of the worst
off group (or, alternatively, person), then maximizes the condition of the next worse off group  (or
person), and so on.[36]  The  radical  priority  to  the  worse  off  granted  by  leximinism  may  be
restrained by some kind of utilitarian or other maximising principle, such that the commitments to
the worse off and to the overall good are both  conditional.  This  limited  priority  strategy  would
imply that, though an improvement for the worse off is always more  weighty  than  an  equivalent
improvement for the better off, a minor gain for the worse off may be outweighed by a larger gain
for the better off.[37] Finally, a sufficiency strategy would ensure that the worst off held  a  certain
minimum of whatever it is that is being distributed, but would say nothing once this minimum had
been secured.[38]
Each   of   these   positions   is   consistent   with   the   bare   statement   of   contemporary
egalitarianism and with (1) and (2). Sufficiency is consistent with (3) while maximin, leximin  and
limited  priority  are  not.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  the  latter  three   strategies,   as   forms   of
prioritarianism, always grant some priority to the worst off, whereas sufficiency is a different kind
of principle altogether – one which makes the priority to  the  worst  off  conditional.  Of  the  two
kinds of principle, the case for sufficiency as a form of egalitarianism is much weaker; indeed,  its
advocates typically present it as an alternative to egalitarianism (Elizabeth Anderson  is  a  notable
exception). Furthermore, the one criticism of prioritarianism-as-egalitarianism that  I  will  present
is, mutatis mutandis, applicable to sufficientarianism.
The general form of prioritarianism might be described in this way:  moral  value,  ranging
from 0 (no value) to 1  (most  value),  is  assigned  to  each  unit  of  whatever  it  is  that  is  being
distributed. Maximin is “binary,” in the sense that the only values will be 0 and  1.  Units  held  by
the worst off have absolute value; units held by those who do not fall into  this  category  have  no
independent moral value (although they may be required to improve the position of the worst off).
Limited priority, by contrast, will make full use of the range from 0 to 1, with the  exception  of  0
itself. Moral value is assigned to every unit, with the specific value of each unit being proportional
to how badly off its bearer is: the worse off the bearer, the greater  the  value.  For  all  prioritarian
principles, the best distribution is that which yields the highest moral value. (Leximin is a bit more
complicated as it would need a series of calculations. The first of these would be exactly the  same
as  maximin’s  calculation;  thereafter  maximin’s  binary  model  would  be  followed,   but   with
absolute  value  being  given  to  improvements  for  the  worse  off  rather  than   the   worst   off.)
Individuals would then have rights to whatever units  they  have  under  the  optimum  prioritarian
distribution.
Many writers have supposed that prioritarianism  is  one  form  of  egalitarianism,  or  even
the kind of egalitarianism worth caring about. This latter  supposition  is  particularly  common  in
economics,  where  maximin  and   leximin   are   often   taken   to   be   the   standard   egalitarian
strategies.[39] This is no doubt linked to the commonplace acceptance of the Pareto principle  (the
view that a change improves  a  distribution  where  someone  benefits  and  no  one  loses  out)  in
economics, but several philosophers have held similar  beliefs.[40]  While  Nagel  allows  that  the
difference principle is less egalitarian than a principle which  would  prohibit  inequalities  even  if
they  benefited  the  worst  off,  he  mentions  a  “very  strong  egalitarian  principle  …   which   is
constructed by adding to the general value of improvement  a  condition  of  priority  to  the  worst
off.”[41] Such a principle may  not  be  strong  enough  to  satisfy  “pure  impartiality,”  which  “is
intrinsically egalitarian … in the sense of favoring the worse off  over  the  better  off.”[42]  Rawls
himself  is  more  cautious,  suggesting  that  “the  difference  principle  is  a  strongly   egalitarian
conception in the sense  that  unless  there  is  a  distribution  that  makes  both  persons  better  off
(limiting  ourselves  to  the  two-person  case  for  simplicity),   an   equal   distribution   is   to   be
preferred.”[43] He adds that this principle achieves some but not all of the objectives of  the  more
obviously egalitarian principle of redress.[44] Even so, G. A.  Cohen  has  suggested  that  the  so-
called “Pareto argument” for the difference principle “has often proved irresistible even to  people
of  egalitarian  outlook,”  and  that  its  “persuasive  power   …   has   helped   to   drive   authentic
egalitarianism,  of  an   old-fashioned,   uncompromising   kind,   out   of   contemporary   political
philosophy.”[45] However many of these theorists continue to describe themselves as egalitarians,
it seems clear that prioritarianism  is  at  the  least  such  an  attraction  to  those  of  an  egalitarian
persuasion that it is worth asking whether it is itself a form of egalitarianism.
How well does prioritarianism meet the  three  conditions  for  egalitarianism?  I  will  start
with  the  second  condition:  The  theory  or  principle  can  be  stated  as  “equality  of  x  for  all
persons,” making no explicit  or  implicit  exclusion  of  persons  or  individuals  and  showing  no
greater concern and respect for some rather than others. This can be done  easily  enough  by  the
prioritarian:  “equality  of  rights  to  whatever  they  would  receive  under  the  best   prioritarian
distribution for all persons.” No individuals are excluded or picked out for especially good or  bad
treatment, and although some will gain and others will lose out on this principle, compared to how
they would fair under other norms, prioritarianism provides a principled justification of this.     
Next, the third condition: the theory or principle pursues equality  in  a  dimension  that  is
valuable  to  egalitarians.  As  just  noted,  the  prioritarian’s  favoured  dimension  of  equality  is
prioritarian rights. As I have loosely  characterized  it,  prioritarianism  does  not  actually  specify
what is to be distributed according to these rights. But this is no ground for thinking that it fails  to
meet the condition. The space that is left open  can  be  filled  in  in  any  way.  It  is,  furthermore,
typically filled in with just the kind of individual prudential value that I have said  egalitarians  are
largely  concerned  about.  The  Rawlsian  maximining  of  income  and  wealth  is   one   kind   of
prudential value prioritarianism;  other  kinds  may  involve  welfare  or  a  broader  conception  of
resources (Rawls himself thinks that income and wealth  are  only  a  subgroup  of  social  primary
goods, which are themselves a subgroup of primary goods).
Two  hurdles  may  seem  to  remain  in  the  way  of  prioritarianism  satisfying  the   third
condition. First, and as already observed, prudential value is not  the  only  thing  that  egalitarians
care about. Although this is true, we have already accepted some theories as  egalitarian  that  only
refer to prudential value, such as equality of resources and equality of welfare.  Such  theories  are
egalitarian, even if they do not say all there is to be said about  egalitarianism.  Furthermore,  there
is little difficulty  in  building  other  considerations  into  the  prioritarian’s  conception  of  moral
value.[46] These can in principle be tailored to exactly reflect  egalitarian  values,  whatever  those
may be.
Second, it might be observed that no form of prioritarianism distributes whatever it  is  that
it distributes in an egalitarian fashion. It is, like libertarianism or utilitarianism, egalitarian only  in
the sense that it  equally  distributes  a  certain  package  of  rights  –  a  package  of  rights  that  is
inegalitarian in content. There is some truth in this objection, but it does not tell  the  whole  story.
While the objective of prioritarianism is explicitly to distribute in  nonegalitarian  fashion,  that  is
insufficient grounds for saying that it does not actually achieve equality in a space that is  valuable
to egalitarians. As noted above, some have refused to distinguish between equality and priority for
the worst off as objectives, and many egalitarians have been moved to accept prioritarianism.  The
kind of egalitarian value that is of importance here is, I  must  reiterate,  fairly  loose,  and  defined
largely by practice and tradition. Prioritarianism is a  view  of  fairly  recent  vintage,  having  only
really been examined and advocated as an alternative  view  to  egalitarianism  in  the  last  twenty
years or so.[47] Before then, egalitarianism largely subsumed it: prioritarian concerns were treated
as a kind of egalitarian concern. As the discussion of contemporary egalitarianism  at  the  start  of
this section might suggest, prioritarianism might better – or at least more directly –  explain  many
views that go under  the  label  “egalitarian.”  The  same  could  hardly  be  said  of  libertarianism.
Utilitarianism would fare  better  than  libertarianism  here,  but  largely  on  account  of  empirical
factors  such  as  diminishing  marginal  utility  and  envy.[48]  Its  refusal   to   give   any   special
precedence to the claims of the worse off places it at odds with egalitarian attitudes in many cases.
Although the kind of precedence to the worse off or worst off  that  prioritarianism  gives  may,  in
the case of limited priority, be less than total,  and  in  any  case  concerns  their  absolute  position
rather than their relative position, the fact that it gives precedence puts it much more  in  line  with
underlying egalitarian values. For this reason, the rights that prioritarianism  assigns  on  an  equal
basis may plausibly be valuable to egalitarians.
This is enough, I believe, to suggest that prioritarianism satisfies  the  third  condition.  But
the first condition is  another  matter  altogether.  This  is  the  condition:  the  theory  or  principle
considers the bare fact that a person is in certain  circumstances  to  be  a  conclusive  reason  for
placing another relevantly identically entitled person  in  the  same  circumstances,  except  where
this conflicts with other  similarly  conclusive  reasons  arising  from  the  circumstances  of  other
persons, in which case a compromise must be reached. Imagine that, this time, William and  Mary
hold  certain  amounts  of  whatever  our  favoured  prudential  value  is  (i.e.,  they  are  in  certain
differing circumstances), and that they are relevantly identically entitled. Since William and  Mary
are relevantly identically entitled, prioritarianism of whatever stripe obviously  requires  that  they
be identically circumstanced. But the  reasons  for  this  have  nothing  to  do  with  William’s  and
Mary’s circumstances. Prioritarianism treats likes (i.e.  those  with  equal  potential  under  present
conditions for furthering priority-weighted welfare) alike, but it does not treat likes  alike  because
of their alikeness of circumstance.[49] 
In  the  case  of  simple  prioritarianism,  where  it  is  the  case  either  that  priority  to  the
worst/worse off is  the  only  value  (maximin  and  leximin)  or  it  is  supplemented  with  overall
prudential  value  (limited  prioritarianism),  the  circumstances  of  relevantly  identically  entitled
individuals do not matter at all when  deciding  how  to  treat  somebody.  All  that  matters  is  the
position of the individual relative to everybody else – whether they are the worst  or  worse  off  or
not – and how treating the individual in certain ways will affect the overall picture  –  whether  the
worst or worse off are benefited. Simple prioritarianism treats William  in  exactly  the  same  way
whether Mary is rich, poor, happy, or depressed, except insofar as  Mary’s  circumstances  happen
to affect the condition of the worst or worse off (which may be Mary or William).
It is true that the more complex kind of prioritarianism that admits further  kinds  of  moral
value may treat Mary’s circumstances as relevant to establishing the appropriate circumstances for
William. For instance, part of  their  being  relevantly  identically  entitled  could  be  their  having
behaved equally responsibly. As  we  shall  see  in  the  next  section,  where  two  individuals  are
equally responsible, and distributions reward the responsible, the circumstances of each individual
can become relevant to  establishing  the  others’  entitlement.  But  with  complex  prioritarianism
these  kinds  of  considerations  are  not  conclusive,  as  the  first  condition  requires.  There   will
sometimes  be  the  potential  for  prudential  value  gains  that  can   only   be   achieved   through
circumstancing persons in ways that do not reflect responsibility  or  other  non-prudential  values.
Such circumstancings will fail to correspond to the  circumstances  of  other  persons.  Although  a
reason for basing persons’ circumstances on those of relevantly  identically  entitled  persons  may
be present in one of  the  component  values  of  complex  prioritarianism,  the  fact  that  complex
prioritarianism as a whole takes that reason to be conditional means that that theory cannot  satisfy
the first condition for egalitarianism.
Application to luck egalitarianism
Like prioritarianism, luck egalitarianism comes in several varieties. The common idea  underlying
them is that persons’ situations should to be  equalized  in  some  important  regard  except  where
their choices or responsible acts justify inequality. This section begins with  a  brief  discussion  of
Dworkinian equality of resources, which may be construed as a form of luck egalitarianism.  What
I take to be the standard form of luck egalitarianism,  equal  opportunity  for  prudential  value  (or
equality of opportunity, as I will call it), is then examined at a little more length. In both cases  the
focal point will be the three conditions for substantive egalitarianism.
To  simplify  greatly,  Dworkinian   equality   of   resources   comes   in   two   forms:   the
hypothetical insurance market version which appears to be closest to Dworkin’s own settled  view
in  “What  is  Equality?”  and  an  “unofficial”  version  which  plays  down   the   significance   of
hypothetical  insurance  market  decisions,  instead  giving  the  central  role   to   another   of   the
distributive devices described in that paper, the envy  test.  The  official  version  falls  at  the  first
hurdle. The appropriate circumstances for any given person are not based on the circumstances  of
relevantly identically or non-identically entitled persons; rather,  they  are  based  on  the  fact  that
they are part of the optimal expected outcome for the average member of society in  conditions  of
limited information. The second condition creates  no  problems  –  equality  of  resources  (in  the
particular sense intended) is extended to all persons. The third condition is, however, problematic.
The equality of rights that is created is similar to that under utilitarianism, being set on the basis of
maximizing  assumptions;  this  dimension  may  well  not  be   considered   valuable   enough   be
egalitarians. In any case, given its failure to meet the first condition, official equality  of  resources
is not substantively egalitarian.
The unofficial version of equality  of  resources,  “envy  test  equality,”  fares  little  better.
Suppose that William’s circumstances differ from  those  of  Mary,  who  is  relevantly  identically
entitled (that is, that they are due the same resources under  an  envy  free  distribution).  There  is,
according to envy test equality,  a  reason  for  placing  Mary  in  William’s  circumstances,  and  a
reason for placing William  in  Mary’s  circumstances.  But  that  reason  does  not  concern  either
person’s  circumstances.  Mary’s  circumstances  could  improve  without  William’s   entitlement
changing since one need not prefer to have  more  of  anything  rather  than  less.[50]  The  second
condition is met as equality of resources (as construed here) holds between all  persons.  The  third
condition is, I think, less obviously troublesome for envy test  equality  than  it  is  for  the  official
variant, as the maximizing tendency of the latter is not present in the former.
The Dworkinian position with the best claim to be  luck  egalitarian  is  a  variation  of  the
unofficial view that takes into account Dworkin’s concern with making distributions reflect choice
but not mere circumstance. On this view distributions must be either envy free or non-envy free in
some way that is justified by persons’  choices.  This  choice-sensitive  envy  test  equality  cannot
satisfy the first condition, satisfies the second one, and may or may not satisfy the  third  one.  The
reasons for this are almost exactly the same as for envy test equality, the sole difference being that
the reference to  choice  may  or  may  not  create  extra  problems  regarding  the  third  condition.
Relevant considerations are given in the discussion of equality of opportunity that follows.
With the failure of choice-sensitive envy  test  equality  to  meet  the  first  condition,  luck
egalitarianism’s claim to be egalitarian rests with equality  of  opportunity.[51]  This  view’s  core
prescription – which may  be  combined  with  or  weighed  against  other  prescriptions  –  is  that
variations in individual prudential value are justified only where they reflect differential  exercises
of responsibility. One important variant of  this  view  holds  that  total  lifetime  opportunities  for
welfare must be equal (or minimally unequal) for each individual.
The first condition, though the bane of several theories, including prioritarianism and  both
kinds of Dworkinian equality of resources, creates  no  difficulties  for  this  theory.  Suppose  that
William holds a certain amount of whatever our favoured prudential value  is,  that  Mary  holds  a
different amount, and that they are relevantly identically entitled (that is,  that  William  and  Mary
have conducted themselves equally responsibly). Unlike any form of  prioritarianism,  equality  of
opportunity takes Mary’s being in those circumstances as  grounds  for  putting  William  in  those
circumstances, and vice versa. The circumstances of a third  person  who  is  more  responsible  or
less responsible than William  and  Mary  would  also  be  relevant,  were  such  a  person  present.
Whether  or  not  that  is  the  case,  individuals’  entitlements  are  entirely   dependent   upon   the
circumstances of other persons. In spite of its reference to responsibility,  equality  of  opportunity
meets the first condition just  as  effortlessly  as  outcome  egalitarian  ideals  such  as  equality  of
welfare.
The second condition is also met  comfortably  by  equality  of  opportunity.  It  guarantees
equality of opportunity for all persons, and shows no person any more concern than any other.
The third condition is a more complicated matter. My favoured  formulation  of  prudential
value is the present mood conception of welfare, but some other conception  of  welfare,  or  some
conception of resources, would also function perfectly well for present  purposes,  since  these  are
all things of  sufficient  importance  to  egalitarians.  However,  the  complication  comes  in  since
prudential value is not to  be  distributed  in  strictly  equal  fashion,  but  rather  proportionately  –
specifically, in a responsibility-sensitive fashion. This commitment to  responsibility  may  appear
to cut into equality. It might be thought  that,  wherever  the  two  come  into  conflict,  it  must  be
equality that yields; that is, wherever one person acts more responsibly than another, inequality  is
established.
Although in one sense correct, I believe that this is to oversimplify  the  situation.  For  one
thing, we have seen that some weak notion of equality is at the heart of virtually every  account  of
justice, and that  there  is  little  difficulty  in  describing  theories  we  would  usually  think  of  as
alternatives to egalitarianism in terms of equality. Equal outcomes may be upset by responsibility-
sensitivity, but that is not sufficient grounds for saying that equality is compromised,  for  equality
in one dimension almost always requires inequality in others. The question is whether  a  decrease
in  outcome  equality  is  an  acceptable  price  for   the   egalitarian   to   pay   for   increasing   the
responsibilitarian version of equal treatment.
As has been hinted already, I think  egalitarianism  is  itself  often  construed  as  involving
considerations of responsibility. We do not typically view real world equal opportunity  as  a  rival
to equality, but rather as one  conception  of  equality  (which  may  of  course  conflict  with  rival
conceptions). If a first child makes the genuine choice to eat her apple while a  second  chooses  to
save hers for later, and a parent then divides the remaining apple between the children, the  second
child  can,  one   would   think,   sensibly   complain   of   being   treated   not   only   unfairly   but
unequally. There is perhaps some substantive idea of equality that recommends  considerations  of
attributive responsibility.
Unsurprisingly, many (at least nominally) egalitarian critics of luck egalitarianism feel that
the benefit afforded by its association  with  responsibility  is  illusory.  Here  I  will  refer  to  two
counterexamples from such critics that I think actually suggest that  responsibility  is,  at  the  very
least, compatible with egalitarianism.
In the first case, the reasons for this have been alluded to above,  but  are  particularly  well
illustrated by the critic’s counterexample.  Timothy  Hinton  has  this  to  say  about  the  apartheid
regime formerly found in South Africa: “What made  the  system  evil,  surely,  was  the  way  that
black people were forced to live … The evil did not consist in the fact that the color of  one’s  skin
is  largely  a  matter  of  brute  luck.”[52]  If  black  people  had  (somehow)  freely  chosen  to   be
oppressed, “that would surely not ameliorate the evil of the  unequal  conditions  that  they  would
have to endure.”[53] But the biggest part of the evil surely is  that  the  disadvantages  suffered  by
the black population are disadvantages for which they are not  responsible.  Contrast  an  apartheid
era  township  with  a  settlement  identical  to  it  in  every  regard  except  for  the  fact   that   the
subordinated population have all committed serious crimes for which they are,  by  their  presence
in the penal colony, paying the pre-established penalty. It is an affront to justice to suggest that the
two cases are equivalent: here at least attributive responsibility matters.
If egalitarianism suggests  that  the  township  and  the  penal  colony  are  equally  morally
wrong I think the sensible conclusion to reach would  be  that  egalitarianism  should  be  rejected.
But I do not think that this is actually what egalitarianism suggests. Egalitarianism is certainly  not
committed to that claim, even  if  it  may  be  consistent  with  it  (as  I  think  must  be  allowed  if
outcome egalitarianism is to count as egalitarian). The moral difference between the township and
the penal colony can be identified as a  difference  of  equality  –  specifically,  as  a  difference  in
equality of opportunity. Provided a society has reasonably just laws, most  egalitarians  would  not
have much time for someone who had committed a serious offence and  then  complained  that  he
was being treated unequally. They would be much more sympathetic to the complaint of  someone
who was being treated unequally on the basis of their skin colour and/or the status of their  family.
This is because there is  an  inequality  of  opportunity  in  the  second  case  but  no  inequality  of
opportunity in the first. If the inequality between an irresponsible person (such as an offender) and
averagely responsible members of society was very extreme – and in particular, if basic needs  are
going unmet or suffering exceeds certain levels – the egalitarian may then start to be concerned by
it. But even if the egalitarian’s concern here is directly related to end-state  equality  –  rather  than
the absolute position of the negligent or malicious person – it is clear that that is not all there is  to
her thinking, and that something else plays a very significant role in it.
It might still be denied that it is specifically responsibility that is doing the work here. This
is  where  the  second  counterexample  comes  in.  Samuel   Scheffler   asks   us   to   think   about
occupational talent and success:
[I]f I have a less successful career as  a  philosopher  than  you  do  because  your  superior
philosophical gifts enable  you  to  refute  all  my  arguments,  then,  contrary  to  what  the
generalized claim might lead us to expect, most people  would  not  regard  that  as  unfair.
Nor would most think it unfair if  a  naturally  gifted  professional  athlete  were  offered  a
more lucrative contract than his less talented teammate.[54]
The underlying idea here seems to be that some conception of productivity or merit  is  the
“something” that explains why egalitarians do not focus  only  on  end  states.[55]  In  some  cases
responsibility  and  merit  coincide,  but  where  they  come  apart  it  is  merit   that   captures   the
egalitarian intuition.
Scheffler’s examples are messy because  it  is  probably  difficult  for  the  majority  of  the
population to conceptualize cases where the difference in ability is purely  a  factor  for  which  no
one is responsible. Those who are successful in their fields  have  generally  tried  harder  than  the
average, and this is reflected in a general scepticism about the importance  of  the  “gifts”  that  are
central to Scheffler’s examples. What the majority would say were they to accept the existence  of
clear cut examples is pure speculation.
But suppose for the sake of argument  that  the  majority  of  persons  in  existing  societies
would not side with the luck egalitarian if clear cut cases could be identified.  Even  then  the  luck
egalitarian need not be concerned. In the first place, the differential career success and  income  in
the examples are, I hold, manifestly instances of substantial social inequality. I  do  not  think  that
the majority would want to deny this,  even  if  they  wanted  to  defend  these  distributions.  They
might say, coherently enough,  that  there  was  justice  but  not  equality.  If  an  outcome  is  both
unequal and derived from differential opportunities then  there  is  no  morally  significant  way  in
which it is  equal  –  no  part  of  our  egalitarian  intuitions  recommend  such  an  outcome.  Luck
egalitarianism  is  a  theory  of  equality  and  responsibility,  and  it  is  no  argument   against   its
egalitarian  (or,  for  that  matter,  responsibilitarian)  credentials  that  it  does   not   capture   non-
egalitarian  (and  non-responsibilitarian)  principles.  A  principle  of  merit  allows  persons   with
unequal talents, which they maybe take no credit for,  to  exploit  them  for  unequal  rewards.  Yet
Scheffler characterizes his criticism as an egalitarian one.
More importantly, however, equal opportunity does not stand or  fall  with  the  volume  of
support  for  its  dictates  among  the  general  public.  Distributive   justice   is   not   a   popularity
contest.[56]  Even  if  the  majority  did  claim  that  the  philosopher  and  athlete  cases   reflected
equality, that would not make it so. If most  ancient  Greeks  or  early  twentieth-century  Southern
state Americans described the master-slave arrangement as  one  of  equality  that  would  not  and
should not  satisfy  egalitarians.  The  emphasis  on  merit  in  particular  is  woefully  unreflective,
relying in large  part  on  the  scepticism  about  natural  variations  in  ability  (certain  disabilities
excepted) mentioned above and a confused notion  of  responsibility  (with  which  merit  is  often
conflated). A sounder, fuller conception of responsibility, taken together with equality, reveals the
natively untalented, with their disadvantages for which they are not responsible, to  be  the  closest
thing to slaves in developed countries in the  twenty-first  century.  Little  surprise,  then,  that  the
population of those countries sees no injustice in their treatment. Here luck  egalitarianism’s  anti-
conservatism is especially evident.[57]
Concluding remarks
In satisfying both of the first two conditions for substantive egalitarianism, equality of opportunity
succeeds   where   utilitarianism,   right   libertarianism,   prioritarianism   and   both   versions   of
Dworkinian equality of resources fail. The remarks at the end of the previous  section  do,  I  hope,
give some plausibility to the  suggestion  that  the  equality  pursued  by  conventional  equality  of
opportunity luck egalitarians may be truly valuable in an egalitarian way. But they are really  only
the beginning rather than the end of the assessment  of  luck  egalitarianism’s  ability  to  meet  the
third condition.[58]
I will end with some comments regarding the status of substantive  egalitarianism  and  the
three conditions. My intention is to capture our intuitive sense of those theories or  principles  that
are properly worthy of the description “egalitarian.” Further general specification is, I  think,  hard
to give, given both the ubiquity of  the  rhetoric  of  equality,[59]  and  the  need  to  steer  clear  of
effectively offering a list of “certified egalitarian”  stances  in  advance.  But  a  little  can  be  said
about the intuitive underpinnings of the three conditions.
The first condition captures something which I think is often assumed, but less  often  said,
by egalitarians.[60] An egalitarian theory’s distribution is one which  is  not  only  equal,  but  also
equal for egalitarian reasons – reasons, that is, to do  with  the  intrinsic  moral  value  of  persons
standing in a certain position relative to others. Utilitarians and others are  keen  to  point  out  that
their  theories  will,  given  plausible  empirical  circumstances,   return   equal   distributions,   but
egalitarians have always been suspicious about the egalitarianism of  such  theories,  even  if  such
circumstances were to hold. This condition explains that suspicion.
The second condition reflects the typically egalitarian notion of inclusiveness.  The  formal
property of equality says nothing at all about which entities the equality should hold between.  But
egalitarians insist that all persons are to be considered, and considered equally, merely by virtue of
their humanity. This universalist and humanist idea is incorporated in the second condition.
The third and final condition provides the  space  in  which  all  the  egalitarian  values  not
accounted for by the first two conditions may be expressed. As such, little justification needs to be
given for its intuitive importance.  If  the  first  two  conditions  describe  the  form  of  substantive
equality, the third condition describes its substance. The relevant values may demand that  persons
have the means to live their lives, and/or that their lives are actually lived well; it may or  may  not
make provision for responsibility or desert. This is roughly what Dennis McKerlie means when he
discusses “substantive equality in the conditions of people’s lives:  not  just  political  equality,  or
equality in the sense of  having  the  same  set  of  basic  rights,  but  equality  with  respect  to  the
opportunities open to them, or the resources  available  to  them,  or  in  the  quality  of  their  lives
themselves.”[61] The third condition allows debate over these issues to  proceed,  and  for  several
satisfactory  accounts  to  emerge.  But  I  reserve  the  description   “substantive   egalitarian”   for
accounts which also meet the first two conditions, ensuring that the potentially vast  scope  of  that
debate stays in strictly egalitarian territory.
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